Abstract. Key-insulated cryptosystem was proposed in order to minimize the damage of secret key exposure. In this paper, we propose a strong identity based (ID-based) key-insulated cryptosystem security model, including ID-based key-insulated encryption (IB-KIE) security model and ID-based key-insulated signature (IB-KIS) security model. Based on the security models, provably secure strong IB-KIE and IB-KIS schemes are constructed in order to decrease the damage of user's secret key exposure. These schemes are secure in the remaining time periods against an adversary who compromises the insecure device and obtains secret keys for the periods of its choice. Furthermore, the schemes remain secure (for all time periods) against an adversary who compromises only the physically-secure device. All the key-insulated encryption and signature schemes in this paper are provably secure in the random oracle model and support random-access key-updates.
Introduction
The notion of key-insulated public key cryptosystem was first introduced by Dodis et al. [5] to minimize the damage of key exposures. In a certificate-based key-insulated public key cryptosystem, a user begins by registering a single public key pk which remains for the lifetime of the scheme. The secret key associated with a public key is here shared between the user and a physically-secure device. The master key is stored on a physically-secure device and a temporary secret key used to perform cryptographic operations is stored in an insecure device and updated regularly with the help of a physically-secure device that stores a master key.
In order to simplify key management procedures of certificate-based public key infrastructures (PKIs), Shamir [11] introduced the idea of ID-based cryptosystem in 1984. In such cryptosystem, the public key of a user is associated with his identity information ID and his private key s ID is generated by a trusted third party called Private Key Generator (PKG). However, key exposure problem also exists in ID-based cryptosystem: User may still store his or her private key s ID in an insecure place to do cryptographic protocols such as ID-based signature or decryption.
To mitigate the damage caused by the private key exposure in ID-based cryptosystem, one way is to construct ID-based key-insulated cryptosystem [10] that allows each user in this system update his or her private key periodically while keep the public key the same. In ID-based key-insulated cryptosystem, the user's master key s * ID is stored on a physically-secure device and a temporary secret key used to perform cryptographic operations is stored in an insecure device and updated regularly with the help of a physically-secure device. The lifetime of the protocol is divided into distinct periods 1, · · · , N . At the beginning of each period, the user interacts with the secure device to derive a temporary secret key which will be used to decrypt messages sent during that period. We denote by s i ID the temporary key for ID at period i, which is stored on an insecure device and will be used to perform cryptographic operations such as signing and deciphering for the time period i. On the other hand, the public key ID used to encrypt messages does not change at each period. We call a scheme ID-based (t, N )-key-insulated if an adversary who compromises the insecure device of an identity ID up to t < N periods cannot break the remaining N − t periods. Additionally, a scheme is called a strong ID-based (t, N )-key-insulated scheme if an adversary who compromises only the physically-secure device cannot break the scheme at any time periods. As also stated in [5] , besides the direct application to minimizing the risk of key exposures across multiple time periods, ID-based key-insulated security may also be used to protect against key exposures across multiple locations, or users. Furthermore, it may also be used for purposes of delegation. Although the IB-KIS security model has been proposed recently [15] by Zhou, the strong secure IB-KIS security model and scheme still have not been formalized and constructed.
Contribution. First, we give a more efficient strong IB-KIE scheme. The scheme is ID-based (N − 1, N )-key-insulated encryption scheme. Then, the first strong IB-KIS security model and scheme are also presented. The schemes constructed in this paper have random-access key updates property. That is to say, it is possible to update the secret key of ID from s 
We say that an IB-KIE E is semantically secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ID-CCA) if no polynomially bounded adversary F has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger C in the following IND-ID-CCA game.
First, C runs Setup of the scheme. The resulting system parameters are given to F. F issues the following queries as he wants: 
The proof of security for our IB-KIE makes use of a weaker notion of security known as semantic security (also known as semantic security against a chosen plaintext attack or IND-ID-CPA) [2] . Semantic security is similar to chosen ciphertext security except that the adversary is more limited: it cannot issue decryption queries while attacking the challenge public key. -Definition of algorithms Setup, Extract, Gen, Upd * and Upd are the same with corresponding algorithms in IB-KIE.
-Sign The signing algorithm, on input ID, i and message m, output signature σ. -Vrfy The verification algorithm, on input σ, ID, i and message m, output 1 if it is true; otherwise, output 0.
We also define the signing oracle as follows:
-SO: The signing Oracle, on input message M , ID, i, and partial secret key s i ID , output σ as the signature. We define the following game: First, C runs Setup of the scheme. The adversary F can query EO, KEO and SO adaptively. We say F wins the game if it outputs (ID, i, M , σ), such that ID, (ID, i) and (ID, i, m) are not equal to the inputs of any query to EO, KEO and SO, respectively. σ is a valid signature of M for identity ID at period i.
A Strong ID-Based Key-Insulated Encryption Scheme
Our scheme uses bilinear pairings on elliptic curves. We now give a brief revision on the property of pairings and some candidate hard problems from pairings that will be used later.
Let G 1 , G 2 be cyclic groups of prime order q, writing the group action multiplicatively. Let g be a generator of G 1 . e(g, g) abc .
We say that the (t, )-BDH assumption holds in G 1 if no t-time algorithm has non-negligible advantage in solving the BDH problem in G 1 .
The Scheme
1. Setup: To generate parameters for the system of time periods N , select a random generator g ∈ G 1 , a random x ∈ Z * q , and set 
·(g
3. Gen: On input s ID , parse it as s ID =(s
ID ), choose a random element η ∈ G 1 , set s * ID = (s 
).
Correctness
The decryption of the IB-KIE is justified by the following equations: ((g 1 , g 2 ) s ) 
Security Analysis
Proof is given in Appendix A. Proof. Assume an adversary F succeeds to attack the IB-KIE with access to the secure device, we will construct an algorithm C described below solves BDH problem in G 1 for a randomly given instance {g, X = g x , Y = g y , Z = g z } and asked to compute e (g, g) xyz . The details are as follows. First, C puts g 1 = X as the PKG's public key and sends it to F. Then C randomly selects an element s * ID ∈ G 2 1 and gives s * ID to F. C will answer hash function, extract, key exposure queries as the proof in theorem 2. If F could break the scheme, from the simulation we can infer that C can solve the BDH problem as the proof in theorem 2. Meanwhile, in the proof of theorem 2, the adversary can query key exposure oracle up to N − 1 (i.e. q K = N − 1) different time periods for an identity ID, so it is obvious that the key-insulated encryption scheme is (N − 1, N ) -key-insulated.
By using the technique due to Fujisaki-Okamoto [7] , the scheme can be converted into a chosen ciphertext secure ID-based key-insulated system in the random oracle model.
A Strong ID-Based Key-Insulated Signature Scheme
An IB-KIS consists of 7-tuple of poly-time algorithms (Setup, Extract, Gen, Upd * , Upd, Sign, Vrfy. In this section, a strong IB-KIS is proposed based on the scheme in section 3.
-Setup: The public parameters are params = (g, g 1 , g 2 , h, h 1 , · · · , h N ) Proof. The proof is given in appendix B.
Theorem 5. The IB-KIS is a strong (N −1, N )-IB-KIS, has secure key updates and supports random key updates.
From the proof of theorem 1 and 3, the result can be easily deduced.
Conclusion
Key-insulated cryptosystem was proposed in order to minimize the damage of secret key exposure and has many other important applications. In order to decrease the damage of secret key exposure in identity based cryptosystem, a strong ID-based (N − 1, N )-key-insulated encryption and a strong ID-based (N − 1, N )-key-insulated signature schemes are proposed. The schemes in this paper are provably secure in the random oracle model and support randomaccess key-updates.
